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Tushnet: The Hughes Court and Radical Political Dissent: The Case of Dirk

THE HUGHES COURT AND RADICAL POLITICAL
DISSENT: THE CASES OF DIRK DE JONGE AND
ANGELO HERNDON
Mark Tushnet1
Scattered Supreme Court decisions in the early twentieth century
dealt with the Constitution’s protection of freedom of speech.2
Radical dissent over United States participation in World War I and
the nation’s intervention against the Bolshevik revolution in Russia
led the Court to its first sustained engagement with free speech cases.
By the time Chief Justice Hughes took the center chair, the national
government largely had abandoned its pursuit of radical dissenters,
some of whom played large roles in the labor organizing that
provided political support for the Roosevelt administration and, from
1935 to 1939, in the Communist Party’s “Popular Front” that aligned
the Party and its members and sympathizers with the administration.
The Depression gave capitalism’s critics more opportunities to
organize, and state governments occasionally went through local “red
scares,” prosecuting such critics—particularly members of the newly
organized Communist Party—who then raised free speech defenses.
Today we may be inclined to associate robust protection of civil
liberties with the legacy of the Roosevelt Court after 1937. But, the
Hughes Court at least cut away some of the underbrush before the
Court’s transformation. After laying out the doctrinal background for
the Hughes Court’s decisions in Part I, this Article examines Hughes
Court decisions involving political radicals in Part II. The Court’s
“conservatives” and “liberals” were less divided on issues of civil
liberties than today’s readers might think. The conservatives may
have felt the tug of a moderate libertarianism that affected their
approach to constitutional law generally; the liberals the tug of
1. This Article is an expansion of the 47th Henry J. Miller Lecture given at Georgia State
University Law School, October 1, 2010. I thank Professor Eric Segall and Dean Steven Kamenshine for
the invitation to present the lecture.
2. See e.g., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907); Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
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advocacy for causes with which they shared some affinities even as
they disagreed vigorously with radicals’ overall programs. And,
constitutional doctrine mattered.
I. THE DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND
At the start of the 1930s the constitutional law of free expression
applicable to radical dissent fell into two categories, with one
important collateral feature. The first category involved cases in
which speakers were prosecuted because what they said had some
possibility of leading to violations of some unquestionably valid
law—what the cases called speech that in some sense caused a
“substantive evil” that legislatures had a right to prevent. The second
involved classic sedition laws, in which legislatures had outlawed
some words or political doctrines as such, without requiring any
showing in specific prosecutions that the doctrines had some causal
connection to a substantive evil. The collateral feature was that the
Court’s doctrines applied to cases involving prosecutions by state
authorities as well as national ones.
Schenck v. United States was the leading case in the first category.3
Charles Schenck was an important figure in the Socialist Party. He
helped prepare and distribute a pamphlet criticizing U.S. involvement
in World War I, and in effect urging that young men refuse to register
for the draft, which it described as little better than slavery and
imprisonment. He was charged with violating the 1917 Espionage
Act’s prohibition of “willfully caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military
or naval forces of the United States, or willfully obstruct[ing] the
recruiting or enlistment service of the United States.”4 Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s terse opinion upheld the prosecution against
Schenck’s invocation of the First Amendment.

3. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Cases applying the standard developed in Schenck. included Frohwerk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (2006).
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Justice Holmes’s thinking was influenced by the word “attempt” in
the statute. As a scholar and state-court judge he had made important
contributions to the development of the common law of attempts. In
his l881 lectures on “The Common Law,” Justice Holmes pointed out
that:
The law does not punish every act which is done with the intent
to bring about a crime. If a man starts from Boston to Cambridge
for the purpose of committing a murder when he gets there, but
is stopped by the draw and goes home, he is no more punishable
than if he had sat in his chair and resolved to shoot somebody,
5
but on second thoughts had given up the notion.

Judges had “puzzled where to draw the line,” but Justice Holmes
argued that the principle was clear: “Public policy, that is to say,
legislative considerations, are at the bottom of the matter; the
considerations being . . . the nearness of the danger, the greatness of
the harm, and the degree of apprehension felt.”6 As a judge on the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Justice Holmes applied this
approach in Commonwealth v. Kennedy, where the defendant had
been charged with attempted murder for mixing rat poison in his
intended victim’s tea.7 Whether Kennedy’s actions were mere
preparations, which could not be punished, or were a real attempt to
murder depended on whether they were “near enough” to the
intended harm:
Every question of proximity must be determined by its own
circumstances . . . . and the gravity of the crime, the uncertainty
of the result, and the seriousness of the apprehension . . . would
warrant holding the liability for an attempt to begin at a point
more remote from the possibility of accomplishing what is

5. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 68 (Little, Brown, & Co. 1881).
6. Id.
7. 48 N.E. 770 (Mass. 1897).
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8

The question of proximity was generally for the jury to decide,
although Justice Holmes reserved the possibility that courts could
block attempt prosecutions where the actions were mere preparations
too remote from the ultimate harm.9
Justice Holmes began his First Amendment analysis in Schenck by
conceding that “in many places and in ordinary times,” what Schenck
had published would have been protected by the First Amendment.10
But, he continued, “the character of every act depends upon the
circumstances in which it is done.”11 Evoking the language he had
used in describing criminal attempts, Justice Holmes wrote that:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
12
proximity and degree.

The war-time circumstances mattered: “When a nation is at war
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance
to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right.”13
Justice Holmes also wrote the Court’s opinion upholding the
conviction of Eugene Victor Debs, the nation’s most prominent
Socialist, for obstructing the draft in a speech where Debs had
8. Id. at 771.
9. Leading scholarly treatments of the law of attempts echoed Justice Holmes’s approach. See J.H.
Beale, Jr., Criminal Attempts, 16 HARV. L. REV. 491, 501 (1903) (asserting that what mattered was a
“dangerous proximity to success,” which was “a question of degree.”); see also Francis Bowes Sayre,
Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 821, 846 (1928) (“It is thus manifestly impossible to lay down any
mechanical or hard and fast rule for the drawing of the line between preparation and indictable
attempts . . . .”).
10. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 52.
13. Id.
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praised draft resisters and stated, “you need to know that you are fit
for something better than slavery and cannon fodder.”14 He dissented,
though, along with Justice Louis Brandeis, when the Court upheld the
convictions of five Socialists from New York, who had printed a
leaflet vigorously criticizing the United States’ intervention against
the Russian Revolution, calling President Woodrow Wilson a
coward, and urging workers to “wake up” and “throw away all
confidence [in the government], . . . spit in the face the false,
hypocritic, military propaganda which has fooled you so relentlessly,
calling forth your sympathy, your help, to the prosecution of the
war.”15 The defendants distributed the leaflet by throwing some
copies off the roof of a building in New York.16 For the Court’s
majority, the only issue in the case was whether the evidence
supported the convictions, and in some sense that was the point on
which Justice Holmes dissented. His premise was that Schenck and
Debs had been correctly decided, but that the Court erred in finding
that “the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown
man, without more, would present any immediate danger that its
opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or have
any appreciable tendency to do so.”17 For Justice Holmes, no jury
could reasonably find that the actions, by defendants who he
described as “poor and puny anonymities,” were done with the
specific intent “to impede the United States in the war that it was
carrying on,” rather than “to help Russia and stop American
intervention there.”18 Justice Holmes then appended a paragraph on
the theory of free speech, which continued to guide him and Brandeis
over the succeeding decade but had no immediate influence on the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment doctrine:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly

14. 249 U.S. 211, 214 (1919).
15. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 620 (1919).
16. Id. at 618–19; see also RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH (Cornell Univ. Press 1999).
17. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 629.
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logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express
your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow
opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech
impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or
that you do not care wholeheartedly for the result, or that you
doubt either your power or your premises. But when men have
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.
Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that
experiment is part of our system I think that we should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death,
unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate
19
check is required to save the country.

Cases like Schenck and Debs could easily fit into the criminalattempts mold—requiring that a reasonable jury could find a
dangerous proximity of success for inflicting the social harms of
“substantive evils”—but the second set of cases could not. These
cases involved statutes prohibiting words themselves, the doctrines of
criminal syndicalism or criminal anarchy. New York and California
had typical statutes. Enacted in the immediate aftermath of President
William McKinley’s assassination by the self-described anarchist
Leon Colgosz, New York’s statute defined criminal anarchy as “the
doctrine that organized government should be overthrown by force or
19. Id. at 630.
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violence, or by assassination of the executive head or any of the
executive officials of government, or by any unlawful means,” and
made it a crime to “advocate[], advise[], or teach[] the duty,
necessity, or propriety of overthrowing or overturning organized
government by force or violence.”20 California enacted its statute in
1919, a legislative reaction to the rise of radical dissent in World War
I. It prohibited “criminal syndicalism,” which the statute defined as:
any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and
abetting the commission of crime, sabotage (which word is
hereby defined as meaning willful and malicious physical
damage or injury to physical property), or unlawful acts of force
and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control or
21
effecting any political change.

Criminal anarchy statutes differed from the Espionage Act. The
latter identified substantive evils such as draft obstruction or
interference with war efforts. It could be violated by sabotaging
weapons and like, activities that were not protected by the First
Amendment under any sensible interpretation. Schenck’s prosecution
rested on the proposition that his words could cause a substantive
evil. The criminal-attempt model required that reasonable juries be
able to find that such words were sufficiently “close”—proximate—
to the substantive evil to warrant punishment. Criminal anarchy
statutes, in contrast, made the words themselves the offense. A
prosecutor had to show only that the defendant had made statements
that fit the statutory definition of advocacy of the prohibited doctrine.
Put another way, the substantive evil such statutes targeted was
speech itself.
With some pulling and hauling, one could force criminal anarchy
statutes into the attempt model: Legislatures enacted such statutes
20. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 160, 161 (Consol. 1909); see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 654
(1925) (quoting the text of the statute); FRANK B. GILBERT, CRIMINAL LAW AND PRACTICE OF NEW
YORK 46 (3d. ed., 1920) (quoting the text of the statute).
21. 1919 Cal. Stat. 281.
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because they believed that the dissemination of the ideas of criminal
anarchy would eventually cause some other substantive evils such as
sabotage or attempted revolution. But, under the general theory of
police powers that everyone on the Supreme Court accepted,
including Justices Holmes and Brandeis, a government could enforce
its police-power regulations without showing in each case that
violating the regulation created a “dangerous proximity of success”
in causing harm.22 A provision of the New York statute in Lochner,
for example, prohibited bakers from sleeping where bread was
produced.23 The statute’s purpose was obvious: Such arrangements
created a risk that human waste products would work their way into
the bread produced nearby. No one thought, though, that a bakery
owner could defend against a prosecution for letting workers sleep in
the bakery by demonstrating that no waste products had in fact
contaminated the bread.
Perhaps the First Amendment imposed a more stringent
requirement, but exactly what the requirement could be was unclear.
The substantive evils that led legislatures to enact criminal anarchy
statutes were themselves punished under other criminal laws. If the
First Amendment required in a criminal anarchy prosecution that the
prosecutor demonstrate a dangerous proximity to successful
sabotage, the criminal anarchy statute added nothing to the existing
prohibition on attempted sabotage.
The Supreme Court’s majority understood all this when it
considered criminal anarchy prosecutions in the 1920s. Communist
Party activities led prosecutors in New York, California, and
Michigan to charge prominent Party leaders with criminal anarchy or
syndicalism. Michigan prosecuted Charles Ruthenberg, the Party’s
executive secretary; New York prosecuted Benjamin Gitlow, a
leading member of the Communist faction that broke away from the
Socialist Party in 1919; and California prosecuted Anita Whitney, a
member of a prominent and wealthy California family who had
helped organize the Communist Party there.
22. See Beale, supra note 9.
23. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 46 n.* (1905) (providing the statute at issue).
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Gitlow’s case got to the Supreme Court first. He had been convicted
for publishing and distributing the Communist Party’s “manifesto,”
which, as Justice Edward Sanford put it:
advocated, in plain and unequivocal language, the necessity of
accomplishing the ‘Communist Revolution’ by a militant and
‘revolutionary Socialism,’ based on ‘the class struggle’ and
mobilizing the ‘power of the proletariat in action,’ through mass
industrial revolts developing into mass political strikes and
‘revolutionary mass action,’ for the purpose of conquering and
destroying the parliamentary state and establishing in its place,
through a ‘revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat,’ the
24
system of Communist Socialism.

Gitlow’s lawyers argued that his conviction should be overturned
because the jury had been instructed that it could convict him simply
for advocating violent revolution, without any showing that the
Manifesto’s distribution was likely to have any concrete result. The
statute, they said, therefore punished “the mere utterance, as such, of
‘doctrine’ having no quality of incitement, without regard either to
the circumstances of its utterance or to the likelihood of unlawful
sequences.”25
Justice Sanford’s majority opinion observed that, as construed by
the state courts, New York’s criminal anarchy statute did not
“penalize the utterance or publication of abstract ‘doctrine’ or
academic discussion having no quality of incitement to any concrete
action.”26 Rather, “[w]hat it prohibits is language advocating,
advising, or teaching the overthrow of organized government by
unlawful means,” words that “impl[ied] urging to action.”27 Free
speech was “an inestimable privilege in a free government,” but
everyone agreed, Sanford wrote, that it could be limited, for

24.
25.
26.
27.

Published by Reading Room, 2012

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 657–58 (1925).
Id. at 664.
Id.
Id. at 664–65.

9

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 2

342

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:2

otherwise “it might become the scourge of the republic.”28 The state
could use its police power to:
punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to
the public welfare . . . . And, for yet more imperative reasons, a
State may punish utterances endangering the foundations of
organized government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful
means. These imperil its own existence as a constitutional
29
State.

New York’s legislature had “determined . . . that utterances
advocating the overthrow of organized government by force . . . are
so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of
substantive evil” that they could be prohibited under the state’s police
power.30
What, though, of the argument that the government had not shown
that any untoward action was likely to occur? For the Court, that
argument missed the point. New York’s legislature had made a
judgment that criminal anarchy created a risk of substantive evils.
The courts had to defer to that judgment, as long as it was reasonable.
And it surely was, Justice Sanford said. Statements advocating
criminal anarchy “by their very nature, involve danger to the public
peace . . . . And the immediate danger is none the less real and
substantial, because the effect of a given utterance cannot be
accurately foreseen.”31 Justice Sanford employed a vivid metaphor:
“A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering for
a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration.”32
New York was not “acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when . . . it
seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled
the flame or blazed into the conflagration.”33 That was enough to
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 667.
Id.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925).
Id. at 669.
Id.
Id.
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show that the statue was constitutional. Then, just as in the case of
barring sleeping quarters in bakeries, it did not matter that the
government did not try to show that Gitlow’s statements were
“likely, in and of [themselves], to bring about the substantive evil.”34
All that mattered was whether Gitlow’s statements came “within the
prohibited class.”35
Justice Sanford distinguished Schenck. The Espionage Act “merely
prohibits certain acts involving the danger of substantive evil,
without any reference to language itself.”36 In Schenck the
government applied the statute to the defendant’s language. Because
Congress had not made any judgment that Schenck’s words posed a
threat of substantive evil, judges and juries necessarily had to
determine whether the words he used posed a sufficient threat of the
social harm Congress had identified, obstruction of the draft or
interference with the war effort and the like. The clear-and-presentdanger test, a reformulation of the requirement of a dangerous
proximity of success, “has no application to [cases] . . . where the
legislative body itself has previously determined the danger of
substantive evil arising from utterances of a specified character.”37
Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented, in a three-paragraph
opinion by Justice Holmes, in which he insisted that the clear-andpresent-danger test should be applied. Picking up on Justice
Sanford’s metaphor, Justice Holmes wrote,
Every idea is an incitement . . . . The only difference between the
expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense
is the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire
to reason. But whatever may be thought of the redundant
discourse before us it had no chance of starting a present
38
conflagration.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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The opinion did not confront Justice Sanford’s argument that the test
Justice Holmes preferred made sense when the legislature had not
identified words themselves as the substantive evil, but not when it
had done so.
Justice Brandeis was even more eloquent in his classic opinion,
effectively a dissent, when the Court affirmed Anita Whitney’s
conviction for violating California’s criminal syndicalism law.39
Again Justice Sanford wrote the majority’s opinion, which added
nothing analytically significant to First Amendment doctrine but only
restated what Gitlow had held.40 Justice Brandeis thought that the
Court did not have jurisdiction to consider Whitney’s free speech
claim, but incorporated into his separate opinion the dissent he had
been ready to file in the case of Charles Ruthenberg, convicted of
violating Michigan’s similar law. Ruthenberg’s appeal was dismissed
when he died, but Justice Brandeis wanted to get his views on the
record.41 Justice Brandeis spent a few sentences attempting to
discredit the distinction the majority offered between Schenck and
Gitlow: “The Legislature must obviously decide, in the first instance,
whether a danger exists which calls for a particular protective
measure. But where a statute is valid only in case certain conditions
exist, the enactment of the statute cannot alone establish the facts
which are essential to its validity.”42 This rebuttal rested on the
implicit proposition that the “certain condition” that had to exist was
a substantial likelihood of illegal action, but Justice Sanford’s
analysis defended criminal anarchy laws on the ground that the
“condition” for their enactment was a judgment that specific
utterances posed a risk that illegal action would ensue. And Sanford
did not take the statute’s enactment as “establishing” that such a risk
existed. Rather, employing what he called deference to the

39. See generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
40. Id.
41. See Ronald Collins & David Skover, Curious Concurrence: Justice Brandeis’s Vote in Whitney
v. California, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 333 (2006).
42. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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legislature, he found that the legislature had made a reasonable
judgment about risk.43
Justice Brandeis’s concern went far beyond what he clearly
believed was the merely technical distinction between Schenck and
Gitlow. In some of the most passionate and eloquent words in the
United States Reports, Brandeis offered a full account of free
speech’s values and of why governments could not be trusted to
regulate speech:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of
the state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and
that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over
the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to [be] the secret of happiness and courage
to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech
and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them,
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government. They recognized the risks to which all
human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot
be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction;
that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination;
that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate
menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good
ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public
discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument
of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies
of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that
43. Id.
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free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is
the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational
fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free
speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe
that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a
serious one. Every denunciation of existing law tends in some
measure to increase the probability that there will be violation of
it. Condonation of a breach enhances the probability.
Expressions of approval add to the probability. Propagation of
the criminal state of mind by teaching syndicalism increases it.
Advocacy of lawbreaking heightens it still further. But even
advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a
justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls
short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the
advocacy would be immediately acted on . . . . Those who won
our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not
fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of
liberty. To courageous, selfreliant men, with confidence in the
power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the
processes of popular government, no danger flowing from
speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of
the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before
there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil
by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify
repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled
with freedom. Such, in my opinion, is the command of the
44
Constitution.

44. Id. at 375-77 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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But these words, powerful as they were, were written in what was
functionally a dissent from the majority’s analysis of the First
Amendment claim. The majority’s more generous view toward
criminal anarchy laws was the law when Justice Hughes became
Chief Justice.
Finally, free speech doctrine had to deal with the fact that the First
Amendment’s terms referred only to the national government:
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”45
The cases arising out of World War I involved prosecutions by that
government, and the First Amendment unquestionably applied to
such prosecutions. State attacks on radical dissent raised a different
legal question. States were barred only from denying “due process of
law,” which the Court in the Lochner line of cases had interpreted to
mean that states could not infringe on fundamental liberties.46 The
Lochner approach was controversial, though, and some supporters of
free speech were uncomfortable with protecting free speech as a
fundamental liberty protected only by the due process clause. As
Justice Brandeis grudgingly put it in his opinion in Whitney, “Despite
arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is
settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of
procedure.”47
Further, the principles articulated in due process cases seemed to
give governments greater leeway than those articulated in the Court’s
World War I free speech decisions. Schenck drew the clear-andpresent-danger test from the criminal law of attempts,48 but it was
hardly obvious that state courts could not modify the common law
rules regarding criminal attempts, and so it was hardly obvious that
the clear-and-present-danger test set the due process limit to state
government power.
The Court finessed the problem. In 1907, upholding a conviction
for contempt of court through publication of articles and cartoons
45.
46.
47.
48.

Published by Reading Room, 2012

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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criticizing the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice Holmes wrote, “We
leave undecided the question whether there is to be found in the 14th
Amendment a prohibition similar to that in the 1st,” because “even if
we were to assume that freedom of speech and freedom of the press
were protected from abridgments on the part not only of the United
States but also of the states,” the defendant would lose anyway
because “the main purpose” of the constitutional provision was to
prevent prior restraints on publication, not to bar punishment after
publication.49 In Gitlow the Court went a bit further. Justice Edward
Sanford “assume[d] that the freedom of speech and of the press—
which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by
Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States.”50 As Zechariah Chafee observed in a
comment on Gitlow, this was a “new gain, the possibility of federal
protection against state suppression. A more liberal court may
prevent a checker-board nation, with ultra-conservative states into
which moderately radical Americans come at peril of imprisonment
for sedition.”51 But, he noted, “[n]ot much can be hoped today.”52
The Due Process Clause had another function, applicable in cases
involving much more than speech. The clause was a guarantee of
fundamental fairness in the state’s treatment of those subject to its
authority. At its core, the clause required that states let people know
which of their activities violated the criminal law. Statutes had to be
clear enough to give notice.53 If a criminal offense could be
49. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). Schneck, also written by Justice Holmes,
backed away from this last conclusion: “It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the
freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the
main purpose . . . .” 249 U.S. at 51–52.
50. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
51. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THE INQUIRING MIND 106 (De Capo Press, 1974) (reprinted from
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Gitlow Case, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 1, 1925).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (Justice Sutherland noted:
“That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those
who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a wellrecognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law;
and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first
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committed in several ways, the instructions had to make those
differences clear, so that defendants could focus their arguments, and
jurors focus their deliberations, appropriately. The First Amendment
fed into these fairness concerns. A statute’s terms might suggest that
it could be violated in many ways, some of which were clearly
protected by the First Amendment. A jury had to be instructed that it
could not convict a defendant based only upon evidence that the
defendant had violated the statute in a way protected by the
Constitution.
The First Amendment as it had been interpreted in the federal
cases arising out of World War I and as it had been assumed to apply
in the state cases of the 1920s framed the Hughes Court’s treatment
of radical dissent. A theory that offered robust protection for radical
dissent had been eloquently stated, but only in dissent. The Hughes
Court’s decisions ended up protecting many dissenters, but not by
directly invoking the First Amendment. They were due process
decisions influenced by the First Amendment.
II. POLITICAL RADICALS IN THE NEW DEAL ERA
Radicals in the United States were critical supporters of the New
Deal in two senses: They played an important role in generating
political support for the New Deal, especially as labor organizers, but
many of them argued that the New Deal did not go nearly far enough,
and saw it as much a defense of capitalism as the beginning of a
socialist transformation. It was at least symbolically appropriate for
the Court to take up its next criminal syndicalism case in 1936, as it
was confronting the Roosevelt administration on the constitutionality
of the New Deal.54
A. Dirk De Jonge and Labor Defense
Longshoremen in Portland, Oregon, were on strike in July 1934.
The strike occasioned violence, and four of the strikers were shot by
essential of due process of law.”).
54. See generally De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
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police officers. Dirk De Jonge, a Communist and longshoreman,
organized a meeting to protest the police action.55 Somewhere
between 150 and 300 people attended the meeting, which was
sponsored by the Communist Party, although only a few dozen of
those attending were Communists.56 De Jonge was the second
speaker on the program. He criticized conditions at the local jail, and
described the police actions against the strikers as “attacks upon the
working class” to break the strike.57 He asked his listeners to buy
Communist Party literature and to help increase the Party’s
membership.58 Police officers raided the meeting, arresting De Jonge
and other speakers. He was charged with violating Oregon’s criminal
syndicalism law by “conducting” the meeting, at which speakers
“taught and advocated the doctrines of criminal syndicalism and
sabotage.”59 According to Harry Gross, one of De Jonge’s lawyers,
the prosecution had been arranged with the assistance of the local
“Citizen’s Emergency League,” which the lawyer described as “a
local vigilante group organized by the Chamber of Commerce during
the strike.”60 The state appointed a special prosecutor to try the case,
again according to Gross “at the request of . . . a group of
commanders of the local posts” of veterans’ organizations such as the
American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars.61 In addition to
showing what had happened at the meeting, the prosecutor
introduced excerpts from Communist literature into the record.
Gross was joined in defending De Jonge by three other lawyers
from the International Labor Defense (the ILD).62 The ILD was
created in 1925.63 Supported by the Soviet Union and taking the
“international” in its name seriously, the ILD’s goals were “to defend
all persecuted for their activity in the labor movement, to defend the
55. Id. at 359–60.
56. Id. at 358.
57. State v. De Jonge, 51 P.2d 674, 676 (Or. 1935).
58. Id. at 681.
59. Harry L. Gross, Vigilante Justice in Oregon, THE NATION, Dec. 26, 1934, at 742.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Gross, supra note 59, at 742.
63. Charles H. Martin, The International Labor Defense and Black America, 26 LABOR HIST. 165,
167 (1985).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss2/2

18

Tushnet: The Hughes Court and Radical Political Dissent: The Case of Dirk

2012]

RADICAL POLITICAL DISSENT

351

struggles of the national minorities, and to support the families of
victims of ruling class terror.”64 It responded to a dilemma faced by
political radicals of a Marxist bent. They were in an awkward
position when they defended their actions by invoking their
constitutional rights. Their theory of law and society implied that
law, even constitutional law, was a reflection of basic power
relations, a tool of the ruling class to suppress the working class. As
the ILD’s head noted, the organization’s purpose was “to destroy the
illusions of a democracy and justice above classes, and to expose
their class character.”65 How could radicals expect judges, who were
among the elites in the ruling class, to interpret the law to immunize
political radicals from persecution and prosecution? As The New
Republic put it in commenting on a long sentence imposed by a
Georgia court on a Communist organizer, “Even a paper as
conservative as the New York Herald Tribune has protested the
outrageous injustice of this sentence, which goes far to prove what
the Communists have long charged about capitalist-ruled courts, in
the Deep South and elsewhere.”66
To a large extent the Communists did not harbor great expectations
of judges. Their main defense of invoking the Constitution when they
were prosecuted lay not in hopes of vindication in court but in what
they called “labor defense.”67 Labor defense treated prosecutions as
occasions for organizing support for radicals. Prosecutions
demonstrated that capitalist “rule of law” was a sham, discarded as
soon as the ruling class felt threatened by radical dissent. Labor
defense exposed that sham through publicity and demonstrations.
The Industrial Workers of the World organized “free speech fights”
from 1909 to 1913, but these fights were disruptive demonstrations in
the streets, not invocations of the law in courtrooms.68
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 167 (quoting the ILD program).
Id. (quoting William L. Patterson).
This Week, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 1, 1933, at 309.
For a discussion, see REBECCA N. HILL, MEN, MOBS, AND LAW: ANTI-LYNCHING AND LABOR
DEFENSE IN U.S. RADICAL HISTORY (2008).
68. For a discussion of the free-speech campaigns, see WILLIAM PRESTON, ALIENS AND
DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS, 1903–1933, at 43–55 (2d. ed., Harvard Univ. Press
1966).
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The best vehicles for labor defense were prosecutions that could be
described as frame-ups of innocent defendants—at least, defendants
who were innocent of the crimes with which they were charged.
Campaigns against the continued imprisonment of Tom Mooney,
convicted for setting a bomb that killed ten and injured forty at a
“Preparedness Day” celebration in San Francisco in 1916, and of the
execution of Joe Hill, for murdering a Salt Lake City butcher and his
son in 1914, and of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, convicted
in 1921 of a robbery and murder in South Braintree, Massachusetts,
foreshadowed the development of labor defense as a weapon for
using prosecutions as an organizing device.69
Labor defense worked best when its organizers could credibly
claim that the victims were being framed, as they could in the cases
prominent during the 1920s. Lawyers who accepted the theory could
ask juries to acquit, even in the face of evidence, and thereby to
demonstrate how working people could stand up to the ruling class.
After conviction, the theory of labor defense had to confront the
difficulty that the lawyers were attempting to persuade members of
the ruling class to let political radicals go free in the face of a jury’s
decision that they had violated the law. This was made even more
awkward when the defendants were convicted of political offenses
rather than ordinary crimes. Radicals were proud of their political
positions, and were uncomfortable at best in claiming that they had
not made the speeches or published the pamphlets that were at the
basis of the charges against them. Mooney, Hill, and Sacco and
Vanzetti might have been framed for murder, but political radicals
were not being framed when they were charged with offenses that
were defined by their radical views.
The advocates of labor defense never fully worked out how
appeals to higher courts fit into radical political theory. Trumpeting
one victory, Communist leader Earl Browder declared, “The higher
court was forced by the pressure of aroused mass opinion and protest
69. Representative of a large literature are RICHARD H. FROST, THE MOONEY CASE (1968); GIBBS
M. SMITH, JOE HILL (1969) and MOSHIK TEMKIN, THE SACCO-VANZETTI AFFAIR: AMERICA ON TRIAL
(2009).
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to set aside the verdict . . . .”70 Similarly, ILD leader William
Patterson asserted, “Not legal pressure alone, but mass pressure, into
which the legal defense is merged, has forced the capitalist courts . . .
to grant a new trial.”71 Yet, exactly how mass pressure could force
capitalist courts to do anything was obscure. One promising path lay
in describing political prosecutions as “legal lynchings.” Doing so
allowed the lawyers to seek relief from one segment of the ruling
class—the judges of the national courts, especially the Supreme
Court—against decisions made by a more parochial segment of the
ruling class, particularly judges in southern courts. The idea was that
sophisticated political elites would understand that legal lynchings
undermined the credibility of the general claim that the capitalist rule
of law was fundamentally fair and generally involved defendants
who posed no real threat to the capitalist economic, social, and
political order. The contrast The New Republic drew between the
conservative New York newspaper and the Georgia courts suggests
this line of argument.72
The lawyers defending political radicals also appealed to liberals
who had civil libertarian inclinations, and in several important cases
liberal lawyers played important roles in the appeals to the higher
courts. Felix Frankfurter, for example, was prominently associated
with the campaign to free Sacco and Vanzetti, in 1927 publishing a
book, based on a long magazine article he had written, offering a
“critical analysis” of the case.73 Rebecca Hill suggests that anarchists
and liberals “bonded over . . . a belief in the importance of individual
ideas—and individualism.”74 The combination of labor defense with
civil libertarianism was more awkward. Labor defense treated
appeals to the Constitution as purely instrumental, likely to succeed
only under special conditions, while civil libertarians had a principled
commitment to the constitutional claims being made. Judges
70.
71.
72.
73.

CHARLES H. MARTIN, THE ANGELO HERNDON CASE AND SOUTHERN JUSTICE 15 (1976).
Id.
Editorial, The Herndon Case, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 1935, at 230-31.
FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS FOR
LAWYERS AND LAYMEN (1927).
74. HILL, supra note 67, at 189.
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considering appeals in cases where a strenuous labor defense had
been mounted might well have been suspicious of the sincerity with
which the defendants’ lawyers were invoking the Constitution. Still,
suspicious or not, they had to deal with the legal arguments as such.
As the 1930s proceeded, political radicals developed another way
of explaining their reliance on the Constitution in their defense.
Captured best in the Communist Party slogan adopted during the
Popular Front period after 1935, “Communism is 20th Century
Americanism”75 radicals located themselves within the American
constitutional tradition rather than outside or against it. Claude
Bowers, a journalist and historian, wrote of the conflict between
Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton as a preview of modern
battles against large corporations, a “clear-cut fight between
democracy and aristocracy,” as he put it in his preface, and the
“spirits of Jefferson and Hamilton still stalk the ways of man—still
fighting,” as he put it on the last page of the volume.76 For Bowers,
Jefferson’s opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts was the true
American tradition of liberty. The Alien and Sedition Acts
inaugurated what Bowers called a “Reign of Terror” throughout the
country.77 The phrase’s resonance with the terminology of a “Red
Scare” used a few years earlier could not have been clearer. In this
view political radicals who took a “Jeffersonian” position against
those who Bowers called “terrorists” who suppressed speech were
continuing America’s best tradition.78
De Jonge’s defense was a modest example of labor defense in
action. During the three weeks the trial consumed, De Jonge’s
supporters filled the courtroom, wearing red badges. At trial the ILD
lawyers repeatedly challenged the special prosecutor’s references to
De Jonge “as a ‘rat,’ a dangerous radical, and a liar.”79 The lawyers
75. Communists: Rain Check on Revolution, TIME MAGAZINE, May 30, 1938.
76. CLAUDE BOWERS, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
vii, 511 (1926). Roosevelt appointed Bowers ambassador to Spain, where he served from 1933, and then
to Chile, where he served until his resignation and retirement after Dwight Eisenhower’s election, in
1953.
77. Id. at 386.
78. Id. at 387.
79. Gross, supra note 59, at 742.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss2/2

22

Tushnet: The Hughes Court and Radical Political Dissent: The Case of Dirk

2012]

RADICAL POLITICAL DISSENT

355

were told that the jury was initially divided evenly on whether to
convict De Jonge, then eight-to-four for conviction.80 The judge reread the instructions to the jury, and a few hours later two jurors
agreed to vote for conviction if the jury also recommended a lenient
sentence.81 Because in Oregon only ten votes were needed to convict
that was what happened: a conviction by a ten-to-two vote, with a
recommendation for leniency.82 The judge, not bound by the
recommendation, sentenced De Jonge to seven years in prison rather
than the maximum possible sentence of ten years.83 De Jonge’s trial
exemplified labor defense in its almost-successful appeal to jurors
directly, and in his lawyers’ characterization of the case as involving
vigilante justice.84
Osmond K. Fraenkel, a New York lawyer affiliated with the New
York Liberties Committee, not then a branch of the American Civil
Liberties Union, took over the case when it reached the Supreme
Court. With a “political bias to the left,” Fraenkel was a committed
civil libertarian who believed that “people should do whatever they
wanted as long as they didn’t hurt anybody else.”85
The precise charge against De Jonge turned out to be crucial. He
violated the criminal syndicalism statute, the indicatment said, by
“presid[ing] at . . . [and] conducting an assemblage of persons . . . the
Communist Party, which . . . was . . . teaching and advocating . . . the
doctrine of criminal syndicalism and sabotage.”86 A police
undercover agent testified at De Jonge’s trial about incidents in
which Communists suggested that members rob banks to get money
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 743.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Gross, supra note 59; see also Cathy Howard, The Case of Dirk De Jonge, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, NORTHWEST MAGAZINE, Mar. 28, 1976, at 9 (I thank Seneca Gray and Tung Yin for
locating a copy of this article.). Two judges of the Oregon Supreme Court would have reversed De
Jonge’s conviction because of the admission of hearsay evidence, the testimony about bank robberies,
and the special prosecutor’s improper appeals to passion. They also criticized the length of De Jonge’s
sentence. State v. De Jonge, 51 P.2d 674, 684–87 (Or. 1935).
85. David Margolick, Osmond K. Fraenkel Dies at 94; Former Counsel to the A.C.L.U., N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 1983, at B6; Roger K. Newman, Fraenkel, Osmond K., in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 200 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009).
86. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 361 (1937).
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for a trip to Russia, but no evidence showed that De Jonge had made
similar statements. Fraenkel’s brief repeatedly sounded one theme:
The charge allowed a conviction simply for helping to organize a
meeting sponsored by the Communist Party, and that was all the
evidence showed De Jonge had done. No evidence showed that
anyone had advocated criminal syndicalism or sabotage at the
meeting, nor did it show that the meeting was one of the Communist
Party; it showed only that the Communist Party generally—in its
overall teaching—advocated criminal syndicalism. As Fraenkel put
it, the statute as construed by the state courts did not punish
“assistance to an organization ‘to advocate’” criminal syndicalism,
but rather “mere assistance to an organization ‘which advocates’”
that doctrine.87 So, Fraenkel wrote, the question for the Court was
“whether a statute is constitutional which punishes a person for
participation in a lawful meeting, called for a lawful purpose, merely
because the meeting was called by an organization which, it is
charged, advocated prohibited doctrines.”88 Under the state court’s
decision, “any person could be convicted who participated in a
symposium called by the Communist Party for the discussion of the
campaign issues of the current year, were such a person a Democrat,
a Republican, or a member of any other political party.”89 After
distinguishing Whitney on the ground that Oregon’s legislature had
never determined that activities like De Jonge’s were dangerous,
Fraenkel returned to the “guilt by association” theme: “If the
conviction in this case can be sustained, then anyone who speaks at a
meeting called by the Communist Party for any purpose whatsoever
might likewise be convicted.”90
The state’s brief verged on incompetence. It did little more than
pile quotation upon quotation from decisions by the Supreme Court
and by state courts. A short passage asserting, “By making it a crime
to preside at, conduct, or assist in conducting a meeting of the
87.
*12.
88.
89.
90.

Brief for Appellant, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1936) (No. 123), 1936 WL 39965 at
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
Id.
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Communist Party, meetings of such an organization are prevented,”91
showed that the state’s lawyers simply did not understand the
distinction Fraenkel drew, and Chief Justice Hughes pressed the point
at oral argument. The fact that Fraenkel’s oral argument consumed
only eight minutes suggested the Court’s inclinations.92
The Supreme Court returned from its December break on January
4, 1937, just a month after it had heard the arguments in De Jonge.
Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.93
Written with what the New York Times called his “characteristic . . .
tight-lipped reasoning and . . . a restrained emotion which often rises
to real eloquence,”94 Chief Justice Hughes’s opinion continued along
the path of developing an affirmative theory of the First Amendment.
As Chief Justice Hughes understood the case, De Jonge was
convicted simply because “he had assisted in the conduct of a public
meeting, albeit otherwise lawful, which was held under the auspices
of the Communist Party.”95 That De Jonge was in fact a Communist
was irrelevant to the charge.
A like fate might have attended any speaker . . . . However
innocuous the object of the meeting, however lawful the subjects
and tenor of the addresses, however reasonable and timely the
discussion, all those assisting in the conduct of the meeting
would be subject to imprisonment as felons if the meeting were
96
held by the Communist Party.

Discussions of tariffs, foreign policy, taxation, relief—all might lead
to criminal liability for participants, were the discussion sponsored by
the Communist Party. Legislatures could address abuses of
91. Brief for Appellee at 30, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (No.123), 1936 WL 40125 at
*29.
92. Id.; Supreme Court Justices Question Closely Oregon’s Argument in Communist’s Appeal, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 1936, at 13; NEWMAN, supra note 85.
93. Justice Stone did not participate because of his recent illness. See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON,
HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 450 (Viking Press 1956).
94. Editorial, The Right of Free Assembly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1937, at 22.
95. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937).
96. Id.
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constitutional rights, but “[t]he rights themselves must not be
curtailed.”97
Chief Justice Hughes then offered a statement of First Amendment
theory focusing on the role speech and assembly had in democratic
government:
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from
incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and
violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate
the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free
assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political
discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained
by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the
98
very foundation of constitutional government.

The First Amendment protected the ability of the American people to
change the policies their government pursued, and even the form of
their government, by peaceful means. De Jonge and others were
“entitled to discuss the public issues of the day and thus in a lawful
manner, without incitement to violence or crime, to seek redress of
alleged grievances.”99 Chief Justice Hughes stated a broad rule:
“[P]eaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a
crime.”100 Criminal syndicalists might be prosecuted for whatever
crimes they committed “elsewhere.” But the government could not
“seize[] upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a
lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.”101
Editorial reactions to the De Jonge decision showed how
protecting free expression could appeal to liberals and conservatives.
The Portland Oregonian wrote that the decision rejected “the redbaiting witch hunts which have characterized some of our
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 365.
Id.
Id.
Id.
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
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officialdom and part of our press here in Oregon,” and a columnist
said that it showed “that we are making headway against the fascist
drift in this country.”102 To the New York Times, the decision showed
that judges “who have so often been described as narrow-minded
reactionaries” could “let the breath of life and liberty” into Oregon,
“one of the most progressive and liberal-minded states.”103 To the
Chicago Daily Tribune the decision “ought to strengthen the
restraints upon hasty impulse in lawmaking” at a time when the
“mood” and the “most powerful leadership” of the American people
“show little regard for the dangers of legislative haste under pressure
of public excitement.”104 All constitutional limitations, not merely the
First Amendment, were designed to protect the nation from
“impulsive lawmaking” enacted during moments of “public
excitement,” when the people “disregard permanent considerations in
the pursuit of an immediate object.”105 “A wise people,” the Tribune
said,
will wish to protect themselves from their own moments of
passionate impulse and hasty decision, . . . [f]or what seems to be
our will at the moment may be and often has been the defeat of
our real will, obscured for the moment by passion, but expressed
106
in the enduring principles our reason cherishes.

The implicit reference was of course to Roosevelt and the New Deal,
in the aftermath of the Democrats’ electoral victory in 1936 and on
the eve of Roosevelt’s challenge to the Court.
B. Angelo Herndon and Sedition in Georgia
Starting in March 1930, Atlanta’s police, directed by prosecutor
John Hudson, conducted a series of raids on meetings organized by
members of the Communist Party, dispatched to the region to help
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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organize workers and relief recipients. Eventually Joseph Carr, an
eighteen-year-old Communist, and five others were indicted for
attempting to incite insurrection, under a statute dating from the preCivil War years. The Communists saw Atlanta as fertile ground
because, facing severe shortfalls in income, the city had cut its
expenditures on relief—as well as salaries for public officials. On
June 30, 1932, about one thousand marchers organized by
Communists under Angelo Herndon’s leadership demonstrated at the
doors of the city council in the local courthouse building.107 Herndon
was arrested eleven days later, for violating the anti-insurrection
statute.108
Herndon, born in southern Ohio in 1913, wandered through the
South after his father’s death in 1922, working at coal mines in
Kentucky and Alabama.109 In 1930 he chanced upon a meeting of the
Communist-sponsored Unemployed Council in Birmingham and
immediately found in Communism an explanation for the poverty he
experienced and a program for eliminating its cause, capitalism.110
He attended national meetings of the Unemployed Councils, and in
the fall of 1930 he was arrested along with Carr for attempting to
organize coal miners in Birmingham.111 Later, the Party sent him to
New Orleans and then, in 1932, to Atlanta, where, paid ten dollars a
week, he continued his organizing efforts.112
Herndon’s presence in Atlanta resulted from strategic choices
made by the Communist Party in the late 1920s. African Americans
had played an important role in the Communist Party almost from its
founding, and increasingly so in the 1920s. By the end of that decade,
the Party was divided over whether to take organizing African
Americans in the South as an important goal.113 The debates
entwined esoteric disputes over Marxist theory with power struggles
107. MARTIN, supra note 70, at 1–6.
108. Id.; GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, DEFYING DIXIE: THE RADICAL ROOTS OF CIVIL RIGHTS,
1919–1950, at 114 (2008).
109. MARTIN, supra note 70, at 8–9.
110. Id. at 9.
111. Id. at 9–10.
112. Id. at 10; Herndon v. State, 174 S.E. 597, 610–11 (Ga. 1934).
113. GILMORE, supra note 108, at 59–61.
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in the Soviet Union, with Joseph Stalin using Marxist theory as his
excuse for eliminating his opponents.114 The argument against
organizing in the South was that revolution was not imminent in the
United States, and that the best way to bring the revolution on,
inevitably a long-term project, was to organize in the industrial North
rather than the rural South.115 The argument for organizing in the
South was that the Depression showed that capitalism was on its last
legs, that revolution was just around the corner, and that African
Americans in the South, oppressed by both racism and capitalism,
would be important foot-soldiers in the revolution.116 The Party in the
United States took the side of organizing, or more precisely Stalin
took the side of those favoring organizing in the South, because the
advocates of the longer-term strategy were allied with his opponents
in the Soviet Union.117 The Party adopted a program advocating
African American self-determination in the Black Belt, with the goal
of establishing a separate state for African Americans, assuming that
that was what African Americans would choose if given the
chance.118 In January 1929, the American Communist Party formally
adopted a program to send organizers southward.119
Herndon’s arrest in 1932 galvanized the International Labor
Defense (ILD), which sent its national secretary William L. Patterson
to Atlanta to locate lawyers who could both defend Herndon and help
in a labor defense campaign.120 Patterson first hired a prominent
white lawyer, with whom he quickly fell out.121 Then Patterson met
Benjamin Davis, a young black lawyer who recently graduated from
Harvard Law School. He had the ILD retain Davis and his partner
John Geer to defend Herndon.122 Davis and Geer agreed to the labor
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 61.
117. Id. at 61–64.
118. Id.
119. See GILMORE, supra note 108, at 70. For a discussion of African Americans and the Communist
Party in the 1920s, see id. at 36–42, 51–57, 70. Gilmore discusses the disputes over organizing African
Americans, id. at 59–61, and the adoption of the self-determination program, id. at 61–64.
120. MARTIN, supra note 70, at 10–11.
121. Id. at 11.
122. Id.
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defense approach, “legal efforts at justice within the court system and
political efforts outside it aimed at undermining the socioeconomic
forces which had originally inspired the prosecution.”123
In court Davis and Geer mounted constitutional challenges to the
indictment, to the exclusion of African Americans from the jury, and,
eventually, to the inadequate questioning of potential jurors to
determine whether they were prejudiced against Herndon.124 Their
first victory was to get Herndon’s bond reduced so that he could be
released from the jail in which he had been held from July to
December.125 A frail young man, Herndon had continually
complained about the physical conditions at the jail, and his release
allowed him to go on a speaking tour as part of the labor defense
campaign.126
Herndon’s trial was contentious, to the point where, as historian
Glenda Gilmore put it, Davis “walked into the packed courtroom a
nominal Republican” and “strode out a card-carrying Communist.”127
Prosecution and defense quarreled over the questions jurors were
asked and the evidence the prosecution sought to introduce to show
that Communists advocated insurrection, even though they did not try
to show that Herndon himself had distributed or even read the
literature they put before the jury.128 Quarrelsomeness was part of the
labor defense strategy too; Davis and Geer tried to show jurors that,
as the Communist newspaper the Daily Worker put it, the changes
were a “frame-up,”129 not in the sense that Herndon had not
organized for the Party, but in the sense that jurors ought to find
nothing wrong with what he had done.130 The jurors were unswayed,
and accompanied their guilty verdict with a recommendation that
Herndon be sentenced to eighteen-to-twenty years in prison.131
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 12, 34.
MARTIN, supra note 70, at 35.
Id. at 101.
GILMORE, supra note 108, at 165.
See MARTIN, supra note 70, at 39–61 (recounting the course of the trial in some detail).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 39–61.
Id. at 61.
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Labor defense then moved into its next phases—an appeal to the
Georgia Supreme Court and, more important to the ILD, a local and
nationwide publicity campaign. A local defense group formed to
publicize the case in Atlanta, which continued to go through a local
Red Scare with new police raids and arrests.132 Nationally, William
Patterson wrote, “only mass pressure can bring about the release of a
class war prisoner,” though that pressure had to be “supplemented by
legal defense” conducted on the highest level, presumably because
judges had to be given some legal hook on which to hang their
response to mass pressure.133 Herndon spoke in Washington,
Baltimore, Philadelphia, Newark, and New York, and then in the
Midwest where he was joined by the mother of one of the Scottsboro
defendants.134 In New York, Herndon told his audience, “the
Southern ruling class thought that they had just another ‘nigger’
case . . . but they discovered they had to take notice of millions of
protests that came in from the masses all over the world.”135
Much of the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision was devoted to
trial-related issues such as the selection of jurors and the
admissibility of testimony. At the end the court turned to evaluating
the evidence to determine whether it was enough to support the
conviction. Herndon came to Atlanta “as an organizer for the
Communist Party,” and the jury could “find that his chief objective
was to press the cause of the Communist Party.”136 So, the jury could
consider the Party’s “program, and statutes” in assessing whether he
was attempting to incite insurrection.137 The court then provided a
fairly extensive summary of a booklet, “The Communist Position on
the Negro Question,” describing the Party’s interest in selfdetermination in the “Black Belt,” and concluding with the sentence,
“[Negro Communists’] constant call to the Negro masses must be:
Revolutionary struggle against the ruling white bourgeoisie, through
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
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a fighting alliance with the revolutionary white proletariat.”138 It
quoted Herndon’s testimony at trial:
We know the system we are living under is on the verge of
collapse; no matter what system we are living under, it has
developed to its highest point and comes back—for instance, you
can take a balloon and get so much air in it, and when you get
too much it bursts; so with the system we are living under—of
course, I don’t know whether that is insurrection or not, but the
139
question, it has developed to its highest point

and asked, “Did this statement not indicate a belief that the
conditions were opportune for a revolution or insurrection and that
now or soon would be a seasonable time to strike?”140 The
Communist Party and Herndon could not reasonably believe that the
Black Belt’s self-determination could occur “by peaceful . . . and
lawful processes.”141 The jury, the court said, could “infer that
violence was intended.”142 The opinion concluded with a long
quotation from Gitlow, and the statement that the “evidence
authorized the verdict.”143
In some ways, the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision rested on the
same perception that animated the Communist Party’s southern
efforts: The Black Belt was ripe for revolution, secession through
self-determination was a realistic possibility, and it could happen
only violently. Northern liberals saw the decision as a large threat to
civil liberties. An editorial in The New Republic, for example, said
that the state court’s decision illustrated “the danger of legislation
directed against radical activities.”144 Because the decision appeared
to “establish the principle that the ownership of any book . . . that
advocates social change is proof of one’s determination to overthrow
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 612–14.
Id. at 615.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Herndon v. State, 174 S.E. 597, 616 (Ga. 1934).
Editorial, supra note 72, at 231.
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the government,” if the decision stood, it would “block every avenue
by which we may hope to reach a better and fuller life, and reduce
our status as free and independent Americans to a point somewhere
near absolute zero.”145
Herndon’s lawyers were surprised by the Georgia Supreme Court’s
decision. Their entire free-speech argument had been that the
evidence presented at trial did not show that Herndon had actually
violated the anti-insurrection statute under the standard, derived from
Schenck, that the jury had been told to apply. The Georgia Supreme
Court, though, upheld the conviction by interpreting the statute to
require less evidence and finding that under the new interpretation
there was indeed enough evidence to support Herndon’s
conviction.146 As the lawyers saw it, this injected a new issue into the
case: Was the anti-insurrection statute, as now construed, consistent
with free speech principles?
Labor defense was well and good as an organizing tool, but
Herndon, who had complained about conditions at the jail in Atlanta,
still faced twenty years in a Georgia prison, where the conditions
were likely to be worse. His lawyers, of course, wanted to overturn
his conviction. Drawing on their connections within the Communist
Party, they contacted Carol Weiss King, a radical New York lawyer
whose network of professional friends included Communists and
liberals. Through her contacts at Columbia Law School, King
recruited Walter Gellhorn, a rising star of the faculty. Gellhorn went
to Atlanta and got another young lawyer just making his mark in
Atlanta legal circles, W.A. Sutherland, to prepare a petition for
rehearing in the Georgia Supreme Court, arguing that the court had
mistakenly applied the Gitlow standard to uphold a conviction for
attempting to incite insurrection, a Schenck-type charge. Returning to
New York, Gellhorn in turn recruited Whitney North Seymour, a
Wall Street lawyer who had served in the Solicitor General’s office
during the Hoover administration, who would give the Communist
organizer’s case a respectable face. Seymour and Gellhorn then
145. Id.
146. Herndon v. State, 174 S.E. 597, 609–16 (Ga. 1934).
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persuaded another Columbia law professor, Herbert Wechsler, to join
them in preparing Herndon’s appeal. The final member of the
appellate team was Elbert Tuttle, Sutherland’s partner.147
With an eye on an appeal to the Supreme Court, Geer and
Seymour filed the petition for rehearing in the Georgia Supreme
Court, arguing that the statute, as it had been construed, was
unconstitutional and that Herndon was entitled to raise the question
then even though he had not raised it earlier because his lawyers
could not reasonably have anticipated the new interpretation. The
Georgia Supreme Court denied the petition. It modified its earlier
interpretation of the statute by saying, “Force must have been
contemplated,” but “it would be sufficient if he intended that it
should happen at any time within which he might reasonably expect
his influence to continue to be directly operative in causing such
action by those whom he sought to induce.”148 Were that
interpretation to be unconstitutional, the court continued, Herndon’s
lawyers had to have raised their constitutional argument earlier. The
court did not explain how Herndon’s lawyers could have anticipated
the interpretation at any time before the court itself rendered its
decision.
Seymour decided to abandon the challenge to the jury’s fairness;
under the statutes regulating the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisdiction,
that issue could be raised only by a writ of certiorari, which the Court
had the right to deny for any reason at all, and Seymour may have
believed that the jury issue was unlikely to attract the Court’s
concern. In contrast, the Court had jurisdiction by appeal in cases
where a state statute had been upheld against a constitutional
challenge, and it was required to determine the validity of that
challenge on the merits—if the case was properly presented to it.
147. MARTIN, supra note 70, at 140-41; see, generally ANN FAGAN GINGER, CAROL WEISS KING:
HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYER, 1895-1952 (1993); Conrad K. Harper, Seymour, Whitney North, in YALE
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 490–91 (Roger K. Newman ed.,2009). Sutherland and
Tuttle founded the distinguished Atlanta law firm Sutherland, Asbill, and Brennan, and Tuttle was later
appointed to the federal court of appeals by President Dwight Eisenhower. See Thomas G. Walker,
Tuttle, Elbert Parr, in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 555 (Roger K. Newman
ed.,2009).
148. Herndon v. State, 176 S.E. 620, 622 (Ga. 1934).
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Seymour’s brief noted that the Georgia Supreme Court had upheld
Herndon’s conviction by construing the state’s ban on attempting to
incite insurrection to permit conviction without jury consideration of
how remote the risk of insurrection was and without considering the
likelihood that it would occur.149 That construction, Seymour
observed, was squarely in conflict with the Court’s holdings in
Schenck and subsequent cases. That was enough to show that there
really was a constitutional issue in the case.150
The fact that the Georgia Supreme Court had refused to address
the constitutional question because it had not been properly raised in
the trial court posed a problem for Seymour. The U.S. Supreme Court
had jurisdiction over the case only if the constitutional claim had
been presented to the state courts in a manner consistent with those
courts’ procedural rules. The failure to raise the constitutional
challenge in the trial court was hardly surprising, of course, because
the trial judge had instructed the jury in terms drawn from Schenck.
Had the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction by finding
that the jury’s verdict was supported by evidence of a clear and
present danger, the Georgia statute would have been constitutional.
Instead, though, Seymour argued, that court came up with a different
construction of the statute, one under which remoteness,
circumstances, and the like were irrelevant. And, under that
construction, the statute was unconstitutional. Herndon’s lawyers had
raised their constitutional challenge at the first moment they could, in
a petition for a rehearing. As Seymour’s brief put it, before the
Georgia Supreme Court’s decision Herndon “was reasonably content
to rest his case upon the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of
State law to meet the standard declared by the trial court.”151 His
lawyers were “not required to anticipate in the trial court” that the
Georgia Supreme Court would evaluate the evidence against him

149. Brief for Appellant, Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935) (No. 665), 1935 WL 32962.
150. Statement as to Jurisdiction at 12–13, Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935) (No. 665), 1934
WL 31894.
151. Brief for Appellant, Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935) (No. 665), 1935 WL 32962.
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“under another standard which is more rigorous, and which renders
the statute invalid.”152
Seymour’s logic was unassailable, but it foundered on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s understanding of what the Georgia Supreme Court
had done. Justice George Sutherland wrote the majority opinion,
holding that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to consider
the constitutional challenge because it had not been properly raised in
the state courts.153 The time line of several Georgia cases, not only
Herndon’s, was crucial for Justice Sutherland.154 He agreed that
Herndon’s lawyers had no reason to challenge the “immediate
serious violence” instruction initially given the jury.155 But, he
continued, Herndon was convicted on January 18, 1933, and
Herndon’s lawyers made a motion for a new trial.156 While that
motion was pending in the trial court, in March 1933 the Georgia
Supreme Court issued a decision upholding convictions under the
anti-insurrection statute.157 In the course of that decision it referred to
a previous decision upholding the defendants’ indictment, describing
that earlier decision’s discussion of Gitlow and Whitney as “useful
and salutary” in assessing the anti-insurrection statute.158 According
to Justice Sutherland, the March decision should have signaled to
Herndon’s lawyers that they should immediately modify their motion
for a new trial to insert a new challenge, that the Constitution
required the instruction the trial court had given.159 Herndon “cannot
plead ignorance” of the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding in the
March decision, “and was therefore bound to anticipate the
probability of a similar ruling in his own case, and preserve his right
to a review here by appropriate action upon the original hearing in
the court below.”160
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 10–11.
Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 442 (1935).
Id. at 445–46.
Id. at 445 (quoting Herndon v. State, 174 S.E. 597, 608 (Ga. 1934)).
Id. at 444–45.
Carr v. State, 169 S.E. 201, 201 (Ga. 1933).
Id.
Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 446 (1935).
Id.
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Unmentioned by Justice Sutherland was the fact that Herndon and
his local lawyers almost certainly knew of the two decisions to which
his opinion referred. The first rejected a pre-trial challenge by the
Atlanta Six, including Herndon’s fellow Communist organizer
Joseph Carr, to the constitutionality of the state’s anti-insurrection
statute.161 The Georgia Supreme Court held that the indictments
alleged sufficient facts to justify a conviction, should there be one.162
In the course of upholding the indictment, the court’s opinion
referred extensively to Gitlow and Whitney. The second upheld the
convictions of the Atlanta Six for violating the anti-insurrection
statute.163
In Herndon v. Georgia, Justice Benjamin Cardozo dissented,
joined by Justices Louis Brandeis and Harlan Fiske Stone.164 Justice
Cardozo pointed out that under the Supreme Court’s precedents the
standard for assessing the constitutionality of criminal anarchy
statutes—the Gitlow standard —was different from the standard for
assessing the constitutionality of a statute making speech criminal
because it posed a risk of a substantive evil such as insurrection, the
Schenck standard.165 Even a well-informed and sophisticated lawyer
would not think that dicta referring to criminal anarchy statutes in a
decision rejecting a challenge to an indictment as inadequate under
Schenck had any implications for the standard the Constitution
required that juries use in prosecutions under an anti-insurrection
statute. Lawyers should not bother trial courts with unnecessary
motions that rested on the guess or fear that the Georgia Supreme
Court would confuse Gitlow-type statutes with Schenck-type ones.
Herndon “came into the highest court of Georgia without notice that
the statute defining his offense was to be given a new meaning. There
had been no rejection, certainly no unequivocal rejection, of the
doctrine of Schenck . . . .”166
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
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Justice Cardozo’s analysis was completely accurate as to the law,
but it rested on a quite careful parsing of the Georgia Supreme
Court’s decision in the two Carr cases. Decided before Herndon’s
trial, Carr I upheld an anti-insurrection indictment against
constitutional challenge, in an opinion with a two-part structure.167
After a series of quotations from Gitlow and Whitney, the opinion
contained an extensive description of the facts alleged in the
indictment. Based on those facts, the court allowed the prosecution to
proceed. The opinion was ambiguous about the relation between its
parts. The first part might have been dicta, with the indictment
upheld because the factual allegations, if proven, would be sufficient
to sustain a conviction under Schenck. Or, that part might have
signaled the Georgia Supreme Court’s position that an indictment
under a Schenck-type statute could be sustained under jury
instructions based on Gitlow and Whitney. The ambiguity remained
unresolved when Herndon’s case was submitted to the jury with
instructions favoring Cardozo’s position that Schenck provided the
applicable constitutional standard. Carr II might have been taken to
resolve that ambiguity, except that its references to Gitlow and
Whitney only indirectly suggested that those cases provided the
constitutional standard. Experienced and subtle lawyers might have
discerned from the Carr cases the position the Georgia Supreme
Court eventually took in Herndon’s case. Davis and Geer were of
course not experienced, and Justice Cardozo’s position, that the Carr
decisions hardly gave ordinary lawyers clear notice of what the
Georgia Supreme Court thought, was obviously correct.
Yet, Justice Cardozo’s opinion did overlook the fact that confusion
between Schenck-type statutes and Gitlow-type ones was widespread.
Indeed, in one sense Justice Brandeis himself, concurring in Whitney,
had argued that constitutional law should not distinguish between the
two types of statutes, and one might say as well that the fact that a
majority of the Supreme Court in Herndon’s case failed to draw the
distinction was a signal that good lawyers should have anticipated the
confusion and so should have raised the constitutional challenge
167. Carr v. State, 169 S.E. 201 (Ga. 1933).
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immediately after the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the Carr
indictments.
The New York Post called Justice Sutherland’s opinion “a mass of
shabby technicalities,” a common reaction among those who
commented on the decision.168 Law review comments were similar.
A note in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review observed that
the Court “is scarcely to be commended to the assiduousness with
which it went about avoiding a decision.”169 The decision, it
continued, “should prove distressing to those who love consistency in
the law, as well as to those who cherish the rights of free speech of
and racial minorities.”170
Herndon’s case was not over with the Supreme Court’s rejection of
his appeal. Seymour filed a petition for rehearing in the Supreme
Court, arguing that under Georgia law Herndon’s lawyers could not
have inserted the constitutional claim into the case by modifying their
motion for a new trial, and otherwise quarreling with Justice
Sutherland’s analysis. Although the Court denied the petition without
comment, the petition mattered because it left Herndon free on bail to
continue the labor-defense effort. The Communist Party had recently
adopted a “Popular Front” strategy.171 Earlier it had denounced
liberal organizations as class-traitors and collaborators with
capitalism, but the Popular Front strategy called for alliances between
Communists and liberals in the face of the common threat fascism
posed.172 Herndon approached the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People for support, and the organization
agreed to file an amicus brief on Herndon’s behalf supporting the
petition for rehearing.173
Herndon’s lawyers’ next move invoked Georgia’s habeas corpus
procedure, which allowed those whose convictions had been upheld
on direct appeal to file a habeas corpus petition for post-conviction
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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relief. Relief could be granted if the original conviction was based on
an unconstitutional statute.174 The case was assigned to Judge Hugh
M. Dorsey. Judge Dorsey had become notorious in liberal circles as
the prosecutor of Leo Frank, convicted of murdering a young woman
and then lynched when the state’s governor commuted his death
penalty into a life sentence. Judge Dorsey had capitalized on his role
in the Frank case to run successfully for governor, where he pursued
moderate policies, including some moderation on issues of race.
Elbert Tuttle, who had worked briefly as a subordinate to Judge
Dorsey, assured Seymour that Judge Dorsey was fair-minded.175
Tuttle’s judgment was vindicated when Judge Dorsey held the
anti-insurrection statute unconstitutionally vague.176 To the Daily
Worker, “The United Front freed Herndon! Onward with the United
Front!”177 The success was short-lived, though. The Georgia
Supreme Court quickly reversed Judge Dorsey’s decision, in a short
opinion that merely referred to its early decision upholding
Herndon’s conviction.178 But, having addressed the merits, the
Georgia Supreme Court opened up its decision to review by the U.S.
Supreme Court.179
The briefs in the appeal of the habeas corpus decision added
nothing new to what had been argued in the first go-round.180
Seymour argued that the anti-insurrection statute was
unconstitutional as construed by the Georgia Supreme Court because
it allowed the jury to convict Herndon without finding the kind of
close connection Schenck required between what he said and the
possibility that insurrection would actually occur. True, the jury had
been instructed properly, but the Georgia Supreme Court evaluated
Herndon’s conviction by using a looser standard. Were the proper
174. Moore v. Wheeler, 35 S.E. 116 (Ga. 1900).
175. MARTIN, supra note 63, at 162.
176. Dorsey’s decision became an issue when he sought re-election in 1936. He won a close race
against John Hudson, who had led Herndon’s prosecution. Id. at 172–73.
177. Id. at 164.
178. Lowry v. Herndon, 186 S.E. 429 (Ga. 1936).
179. MARTIN, supra note 63, at 164 (quoting Daily Worker); Lowry v. Herndon, 186 S.E. 429 (Ga.
1936).
180. See generally Brief for Appellee, Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (Nos. 474, 475), 1937
WL 40657.
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standard to be applied, Seymour argued, the conviction was not
supported by sufficient evidence. The state’s brief suggested that the
Court abandon the “clear and present danger” test for the older “bad
tendency” test that Schenck had rejected.
A five-justice majority of the Supreme Court rejected Georgia’s
innovative suggestion, and applied Schenck, or at least purported to
do so.181 Saying that the state’s power “to abridge freedom of speech
. . . is the exception rather than the rule,”182 Justice Owen Robert’s
largely pedestrian opinion drew the appropriate distinction between
Schneck-type cases and Gitlow-type ones and cited De Jonge to show
that state laws had to have an “appropriate relation to the safety of
the state.”183 Reading the state court’s decisions, Justice Roberts
concluded that the state court had necessarily construed its statute to
mean that “one who seeks members for . . . a party which has the
purposes and objects disclosed by the documents in evidence may be
found guilty of an attempt to incite insurrection.”184
That construction led Justice Roberts to examine the evidence
against Herndon closely. Justice Roberts noted Georgia’s “especial[]”
reliance on the booklet The Communist Position on the Negro
Question, which he described in detail.185 Did Herndon incite
insurrection by inducing people to join the Communist Party:
by reason of the fact that they agreed to abide by the tenets of the
party, some of them lawful, others, as may be assumed,
unlawful, in the absence of proof that he brought the unlawful
aims to their notice . . . or that the fantastic program they
envisaged was conceived of by any one as more than an ultimate
186
ideal?

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
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As construed, the statute did not allow the judge and jury to “appraise
the circumstances and character of the defendant’s utterances or
activities as begetting a clear and present danger of forcible
obstruction of a particular state function.”187 Rather, the jury could
convict if it concluded that “any act or utterance” Herndon made “in
opposition to the established order . . . might, in the distant future,
eventuate in a combination to offer forcible resistance to the state.”188
He did not have to “advocate resort to force,” and indeed, Justice
Roberts wrote, had Herndon merely “forecast that, as a result of a
chain of causation, following his proposed action a group may arise
at some future date . . . resort to force,” he could be found guilty.189
The scope of potential liability, as Justice Roberts described it, was
enormous:
Every person who attacks existing conditions, who agitates for a
change in the form of government, must take the risk that if a
jury should be of opinion he ought to have foreseen that his
utterances might contribute in any measure to some future
forcible resistance to the existing government, he may be
190
convicted . . . .

Phrases such as “reasonably might foretell” and “some time in the
indefinite future” were the hallmarks of a statute that restricted
freedom of speech far too much.191 Georgia’s statute “as construed
and applied, amounts merely to a dragnet which may enmesh any one
who agitates for a change of government if a jury can be persuaded
that he ought to have foreseen his words would have some effect in
the future conduct of others.”192
Justice Roberts and his colleagues in the majority said that they
were only following through on the logic of Schenck and its concern
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 261 (1937).
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 263–64.
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that juries might be enflamed by local and national passions against
radical dissenters who posed no serious threat to the government’s
stability. The Four Horsemen, led by Justice Willis Van Devanter,
disagreed. Their concurrence in De Jonge showed that they had no
quarrel with the principles Justice Roberts articulated. They did
think, though, that the evidence showed a greater threat than the
majority acknowledged. They found the program for the Black Belt,
as elaborated in the booklet from which Justice Van Devanter quoted
extensively, far more dangerous than the majority had it.193 Justice
Van Devanter pointed out that the booklet “was particularly adapted
to appeal to negroes” in the South, “for it pictured their condition as
an unhappy one.”194 As had the Georgia Supreme Court, Justice Van
Devanter’s analysis unconsciously echoed the Communist Party’s
understanding: Proposing to create an independent state in the Black
Belt “was nothing short of advising a resort to force and violence, for
all know that such measures could not be effected otherwise.”195
Given this threat, the state was entitled to convict Herndon if the jury
found that illegal action might take place “at any time within which
[Herndon] might reasonably expect his influence to continue to be
directly operative.”196
This might well have been a reasonable interpretation of what
“clear and present danger” meant in the context of the World War I
cases, which had, after all, upheld the convictions in Abrams197 under
circumstances where the likelihood of anyone doing anything serious
was far smaller than the threat in the South during the Depression.
The nation, though, was more than a decade beyond the World War I
prosecutions and the Red Scare of the early 1920s, and “clear and
present danger” had come to mean something more stringent than it
had in the early 1920s. Justice Roberts’s opinion applied the test as it
had come to be understood by 1937.198
193. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 272–78 (1937) (Van Devanter, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 275.
195. Id. at 276.
196. Id. at 277 (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
198. Herndon remained a Communist into the 1940s, and co-edited a Communist-sponsored cultural
magazine, The Negro Quarterly, with Ralph Ellison for a few years. He then drifted away from the
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CONCLUSION
Historian Glenda Gilmore connects Herndon v. Lowry to the
“switch in time.”199 Editorial reactions to Herndon v. Lowry similarly
read it against the background of Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan. To
the New York Times, the decision showed that the Court’s critics
overlooked the fact that the Court stood in the way of “injustice,
hysteria and tyranny,” and was “the guardian of civil rights belonging
to even the humblest citizen.”200 The St. Louis Post-Dispatch said
that the decision showed that the Court “again stands out in bold
relief as an indispensable bulwark of human rights against invasion
by unwarranted governmental authority.”201 For liberal columnist
Heywood Broun five-to-four decisions favoring civil liberties were
fine, but “they are not good enough to stand as fundamental
settlements of pressing problems, since it is not beyond the bounds of
experience for a Justice of the Supreme Court to change his mind.”202
Unlike the claims about Justice Roberts’s change in position in West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, this one is at least unembarrassed by a
question of timing. Roosevelt announced the Court-packing plan on
Friday, February 5, 1937; Herndon v. Lowry was argued three days
later, on Monday, February 8, 1937. And, Justice Roberts’s
evaluation of the evidence against Herndon was quite searching and
skeptical.
Yet, the association of Herndon v. Lowry with the switch-in-time
seems strained. Roosevelt had made it clear that the Court-packing
plan was aimed at getting the Court out of the horse-and-buggy age
so that it would uphold New Deal initiatives. Whatever Justice
Roberts might have thought about the threat Court-packing posed to
the Court, he could not reasonably have believed that Roosevelt or
anyone else likely to go after the Court’s power cared in the slightest
Party, eventually moving from New York to the Midwest to work in sales. MARTIN, supra note 70, at
212–13.
199. GILMORE, supra note 108, at 195.
200. MARTIN, supra note 70, at 188.
201. MARTIN, supra note 70, at 188–89.
202. MARTIN, supra note 70, at 187. For a compilation of editorial reactions, see id. at 184–88.
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about how the Court dealt with domestic radicals. Herndon v. Lowry
is better understood as another step in the Court’s gradual distancing
itself from its decisions in the aftermath of the Red Scare of the
1920s. In Schenck Holmes had written, “When a nation is at war
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance
to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right.”203 This was simultaneously a suggestion that the
constitutional rule should be applied differently in peacetime than in
wartime and a prediction about what courts would do. De Jonge and
Herndon v. Lowry confirmed both the doctrinal differences between
war and peace, and Holmes’s prediction. Perhaps enough Justices
came to think that they had overreacted in approving too much of
what had been done in the 1920s that they chose to employ the
framework of those decisions to reach results in De Jonge and
Herndon v. Lowry more tolerant of radical dissent. They may have
been encouraged to do so by the fact that, unlike what had happened
in the 1920s, the federal government abstained from serious attacks
on domestic radicalism in the 1930s. De Jonge and Herndon v.
Lowry are undoubtedly different in tone from Gitlow and Whitney,
though not on their face different in doctrine. But, the differences did
not arise from the dramatic events of early 1937. They had deeper
roots.

203. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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